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Abstract
This paper provides new analytical tools for studying principal–agent
problems with adverse selection and limited commitment. By allowing the
principal to use general communication devices we overcome the literature’s
common, but overly restrictive focus on one–shot, direct communication.
In addition, general communication devices solve two fundamental prob-
lems of contracting with imperfect commitment: First, they allow us to
identify the ‘local downward’ incentive constraints as the relevant ones if
the agent’s preferences satisfy a single–crossing property. Second, we show
how one may restrict the cardinality of the message spaces of the communi-
cation device. An example illustrates our arguments and the suboptimality
of one–shot, direct communication.
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This paper provides a new analytical framework for studying contracting prob-
lems with adverse selection and limited commitment. We consider a principal–
agent setup in which the principal is imperfectly informed about the agent’s type.
Further, he cannot contractually commit himself to some actions. The principal
may, however, extract information from the agent by employing a general com-
munication device. This device uses as input a report submitted by the agent
and generates as output a publicly observable message. The set of possible in-
puts and outputs and the rules for transforming inputs into outputs are part of
the contract.
General communication devices are well–known from game theory (e.g. My-
erson (1982), Forges (1986)), but are not generally used in contract theory.1 This
is surprising because it is well–known that the set of implementable allocations
may be strictly larger when players use indirect rather than direct communication.
Yet, contract theory normally restricts attention to one–shot, direct communi-
cation, where the agent simply sends a single message directly to the principal.
This restriction is unproblematic when the principal has full commitment; but for
settings with imperfect commitment it is overly restrictive in two respects. First,
already Forges (1990b) has demonstrated that multiple communication stages
between one privately informed (the agent) and one uninformed party (the prin-
cipal) enlarges the set of outcomes. More recently, Krishna and Morgan (2004)
show that in the cheap talk game of Crawford and Sobel (1982) two rounds of
communication typically generate Pareto improvements.2 Second, as the commu-
nication literature (e.g. Myerson (1982), Forges (1986)) shows, even mechanisms
with multiple stages of direct communication are restrictive in comparison to
mechanisms that allow for indirect communication.3 For these reasons, the use
of one–shot, direct communication in contracting problems with imperfect com-
mitment appears questionable. Consequently, we adopt general communication
devices to study such contracting problems.
Moreover, general communication devices also allow us to solve two analytical
1In a rather diﬀerent context Laﬀont and Martimort (1997) consider a communication de-
vice to study the bargaining behavior between a supervisor and an agent under two–sided
asymmetric information.
2See also Aumann and Hart (2003) for analytical tools to study optimal communication in
cheap talk games.
3See also Krishna and Morgan (2004) and Mitusch and Strausz (2005).
1problems that prevent a tractable analysis of contracting problems with imperfect
commitment: First, with general communication devices, we are able to identify
the relevant incentive restrictions. As a result, even under imperfect commit-
ment the principal’s contracting problem can be solved by following a routine
that is familiar from the theory of contracting with full commitment. Indeed, we
ﬁrst show that the global incentive compatibility constraints can be replaced by
the usual local downward constraints, if the agent’s preferences satisfy a familiar
single–crossing property. This information about the structure of the optimal
contract allows us to concentrate on a relaxed problem that is much easier to
solve than the original contracting problem. Second, for the relaxed problem
it is suﬃcient to consider message spaces that have the same cardinality as the
agent’s type space: Not only the set of ingoing reports but also the set of outgoing
messages can be taken as a copy of the set of the agent’s types. Thus the agent
reveals his type truthfully to the communication system, which then generates a
message suggesting a type of the agent. Yet, typically the principal will remain
imperfectly informed because the optimal communication system is noisy; it con-
verts the agent’s report into a message according to non–degenerate transition
probabilities.
We therefore stress that communication devices not only generalize but also
simplify the analysis of contracting problems with imperfect commitment. In-
deed, the literature so far has been rather unsuccessful in developing a manage-
able framework for these types of contracting problems, which inevitably arise
when addressing issues such as ex post renegotiation (e.g. Dewatripont (1989)),
repeated short–term contracting (e.g. Laﬀont and Tirole (1986)), or environments
in which the principal takes some non–veriﬁable, and hence non–contractible, de-
cision (e.g. Khalil (1997)). Laﬀont and Tirole (1986) illustrate the diﬃculties
of extending the standard contracting framework to problems of imperfect com-
mitment. It leads them to conclude that “the lack of commitment in repeated
adverse–selection situations leads to substantial diﬃculties for contract theory”
(Laﬀont and Tirole (1993), p. 377). This paper shows that these diﬃculties are
in fact related to the restriction to one–shot, direct communication. Indeed, for
this type of communication Bester and Strausz (2001) establish a variation of
the Revelation Principle4 which allows stating the contracting problem as a well–
deﬁned maximization program with the usual incentive compatibility constraints.
Yet, even when the agent’s preferences satisfy a single–crossing condition, it re-
4See Gibbard (1973), Green and Laﬀont (1977), Dasgupta et. al. (1979) and Myerson
(1979).
2mains unclear which of these constraints are binding. Solving the contracting
problem requires a laborious checking of all combinations of incentive constraints
(e.g. Laﬀont and Tirole (1987)).
Our ﬁrst step in showing that general communication devices improve
tractability is to adopt the Revelation Principle for Bayesian games (see: Myerson
(1982), Forges (1986)). This principle states that, without loss of generality, the
principal may use an incentive compatible contract. Under such a contract, the
set of the agent’s reports is simply the set of his types and his optimal strategy
is to announce his type truthfully to the communication system. Therefore the
contracting problem may be formulated as a maximization problem with incen-
tive and individual rationality constraints. We show that this problem may be
drastically simpliﬁed if the agent’s preferences satisfy a single–crossing condition.
Similarly to contracting problems with full commitment, this condition implies a
monotonicity property of implementable allocations. Conversely, the monotonic-
ity property together with the downward incentive constraints guarantees that all
of the incentive compatibility and individual rationality conditions are satisﬁed.
If there are |T| types of the agent, this means that the |T|×|T −1|+|T| incentive
compatibility and individual rationality constraints can be replaced by 2|T| − 1
downward incentive and monotonicity constraints.
Replacing the global incentive constraints by local constraints is, however,
only the ﬁrst step towards making the contracting problem tractable. Accord-
ing to the Revelation Principle for Bayesian games, the communication device
involves a set of outgoing messages with the same dimensionality as the set of the
principal’s actions. This creates a diﬃculty for computing an optimal communi-
cation device when the principal’s action set is large. We address the problem of
the cardinality of the message space by noting that monetary transfers and the
vectors of transition probabilities of the communication device enter the princi-
pal’s problem linearly. Therefore, we can apply a result from the theory of linear
semi-inﬁnite programming to show that a message set of cardinality |T| is suﬃ-
cient to support an optimal contract as long as the monotonicity constraints are
not binding. When some monotonicity constraints are binding, the cardinality
of the message set increases by the number of binding monotonicity constraints.
Since there are exactly |T| − 1 monotonicity constraints, the cardinality of the
optimal message set is at most 2|T| − 1.
In summary, our ﬁndings allow us to derive the solution of the contracting
problem by using the same methodology as for contracting with full commitment:
3For a communication system with |T| outgoing messages, we consider a maximiza-
tion program where the global incentive and individual rationality constraints are
replaced by the downward incentive compatibility constraints. If the solution of
this program satisﬁes the monotonicity constraints, then it represents an optimal
contract. If not, then one may use the repetitive procedure of including a binding
monotonicity constraint in the maximization program and raising the number of
outgoing messages by one, until one obtains a solution under which all the omit-
ted monotonicity constraints are not binding. We illustrate this methodology in
an example with |T| = 2, where monotonicity is automatically satisﬁed. Also, in
this example noisy communication is superior to direct communication.
In Section 2 we describe the contracting environment. The concept of a com-
munication device is explained in Section 3. In Section 4 we use the single–
crossing assumption to show that the global incentive constraints can be replaced
by local constraints. We address the cardinality of the message space under an op-
timal communication device in Section 5. Section 6 contains concluding remarks.
All proofs are relegated to an appendix.
2 The Environment
Consider a two–stage contracting problem between a principal and an agent.
In the ﬁrst stage, the principal can contractually commit himself to a decision
x ∈ X and a monetary transfer w ∈ I R. In the second stage, he selects a decision
y ∈ Y (x) ⊂ Y. The latter decision is not contractible in the ﬁrst stage and so the
principal will choose y at his own discretion. We allow the contractible decision
x to limit the feasible set Y (x) of non–contractible decisions.
In addition to the restriction of imperfect commitment, the contracting parties
face a problem of one–sided asymmetric information: In stage 1 the agent has
private information about his type ti ∈ T = {t1,...,t|T|}, where |T| < ∞. The
principal only knows the probability distribution γ = (γ1,...,γ|T|) of the agent’s
type, with γi > 0 and
P
i γi = 1. The payoﬀs of the two parties depend on the
agent’s type ti, the decisions (x,y) and the monetary transfer w. We denote the
principal’s payoﬀ by
Vi(x,y,w) = vi(x,y) − w (1)
and the agent’s payoﬀ by
Ui(x,y,w) = ui(x,y) + w. (2)
4The agent has the option to refuse to contract with the principal; his reserva-
tion payoﬀ equals zero, independently of his type. Of course, under an optimal
contract the decisions (x,y) and the transfer w will depend on the information
that the principal can extract from the agent. In the subsequent sections, we
investigate the properties of optimal communication devices.
Contract theory makes extensive use of single–crossing conditions on the
agent’s preferences. These conditions imply an ordering of the agent’s types,
which is natural in many economic environments. In our context we impose a
single–crossing property by the following assumption:
Assumption 1 (Single–Crossing Property) There exists a z = (z1,...,z|T|)
∈ I R
|T|
++ and a pair of functions ϕ:X × Y → I R, ψ:X × Y → I R such that
ui(x,y) = zi ϕ(x,y) + ψ(x,y). (3)
Moreover, either ϕ(x,y) < 0 and zi > zi+1, or ϕ(x,y) > 0 and zi < zi+1, for all
(x,y) ∈ X × Y and ti ∈ T\{t|T|}.
Our formulation of the single–crossing property is an extension of the familiar
multiplicative form that is used in many contracting problems with full commit-
ment (e.g. Baron and Myerson (1982), Maskin and Riley (1984), and Mussa and
Rosen (1978)). Indeed, if the set Y = {y0} is a singleton, there is no commitment
problem and only the contractible decision x is available for screening purposes.
In this case, we may redeﬁne ˜ x = ϕ(x,y0) so that Assumption 1 implies that the




equals zi and is monotone in type.
Whenever, for some x ∈ X, the set Y (x) contains more than one element,
the principal faces a problem with imperfect commitment. An example is Khalil
(1997), where the principal has the possibility to audit the agent after the con-
tracting stage. Since the principal is unable to commit contractually to an au-
diting strategy, he selects ex–post the probability y of an audit from the set
Y = [0,1]. In Khalil’s model, the principal pays the agent the wage w for pro-
ducing some output q. The agent of type ti has the cost zi q for producing q
units of output. After output has been produced, the principal can perform a
non–contractible audit at a cost c to veriﬁably reveal the agent’s type. Therefore,
5in addition to a quantity q, a contract speciﬁes a transfer ¯ w0 if the principal does
not audit the agent and a transfer ¯ wi if the principal audits and discovers that the
agent is of type ti. The transfers may be negative, but Khalil assumes that they
are bounded to rule out unlimited penalties. Hence, the contractible decision is
x = (q, ¯ w0, ¯ w1,..., ¯ w|T|) ∈ X ⊂ I R+ × I R
|T|+1 and the non–contractible decision
is the probability of monitoring y ∈ [0,1]. Thus, an agent of type ti receives the
payoﬀ
Ui(x,y,w) = w + y ¯ wi + (1 − y)¯ w0 − ziq, (5)
which satisﬁes our Assumption 1 for ϕ(x,y) = −q and ψ(x,y) = y ¯ wi+(1−y)¯ w0.
We want to stress, however, that the decision variables x and y may be more
general than simple actions. For instance, the decision y may represent a con-
tinuation contract in a framework of repeated contracting without commitment.
Consider for example a two–period model of short–term procurement contracts,
in which the agent produces some output q in each period. The ti–agent’s pro-
duction cost is zi q. In the ﬁrst period, the principal oﬀers the payment w for the
output q. In the second period, there is no commitment problem and the principal
optimally oﬀers an incentive compatible menu y = ((¯ q1, ¯ w1),...,(¯ q|T|, ¯ w|T|)) so that
the agent of type ti selects the output ¯ qi to receive the payment ¯ wi. Let Y denote
the set of incentive compatible and individually rational second period contract
menus.5 In our terminology, the contractible decision is the ﬁrst period output
x = q ∈ X and y ∈ Y describes the non-contractible second period decision. The
agent’s payoﬀ in this environment is
Ui(x,y,w) = w + δ ¯ wi − zi(q + δ¯ qi), (6)
where δ ∈ (0,1) represents his discount factor. This payoﬀ is consistent with
Assumption 1 for ϕ(x,y) = −(q+δ¯ qi) and ψ(x,y) = δ ¯ wi. The speciﬁcation in (6)
is immediately applicable to a repeated version of the Baron and Myerson (1982)
model. But (6) can also be adapted to the regulatory framework of Laﬀont and
Tirole (1986, 1987, 1993), where the agent produces a single unit and incurs
the observable cost c. This cost depends on the agent’s type ti ∈ I R++ and his
unobservable eﬀort e according to
c = ti − e. (7)
5That is, each y ∈ Y satisﬁes for all ti the individual rationality condition ¯ wi −zi ¯ qi ≥ 0 and
the incentive compatibility condition ¯ wi − zi ¯ qi ≥ ¯ wj − zi ¯ qj for all tj
6The agent’s eﬀort cost is k(e). In the ﬁrst period, the principal requires a cost
level c in exchange for a transfer w. In the second period, he oﬀers an incentive
compatible menu y = ((¯ c1, ¯ w1),...,(¯ c|T|, ¯ w|T|)) that induces the ti–agent to select
the cost level ¯ ci in combination with the transfer ¯ wi. Therefore, the agent’s payoﬀ
is
w − k(ti − c) + δ[¯ wi − k(ti − ¯ ci)]. (8)
If the agent’s eﬀort cost is exponential so that k(e) = exp(e) − 1, we may deﬁne
zi ≡ exp(ti) and q ≡ exp(−c) to rewrite the agent’s utility as
w + δ ¯ wi − zi(q + δ¯ qi) + (1 + δ), (9)
which is of the same form as the r.h.s. of (6) and thus ﬁts our framework.
Since we allow the decision x to restrict the set Y , we may also use our
environment to study problems of renegotiation (e.g. Laﬀont and Tirole (1990),
Rey and Salanie (1996)), where the ﬁrst period decisions restrict the feasible set
in the second period. By employing the technique of dynamic programming, our
environment can further be extended to multi–stage contracting problems with
limited commitment (e.g. Hart and Tirole (1988)).6 Hence, our framework is
applicable to the kind of contracting problems with imperfect commitment that
have been addressed in the literature.
Under our Assumption 1 private information is essentially one–dimensional.
Consequently, our model addresses the class of one–dimensional screening prob-
lem with imperfect commitment. Indeed, as emphasized in Matthews and Moore
(1987), the single–crossing condition only makes sense in problems with one–
dimensional private information. We do not study multi–dimensional screening
problems, which generate a number of analytical diﬃculties already within the
framework of full commitment (see e.g. Rochet and Chone (1998)).
In the following sections we illustrate the role of noisy communication by an
example which is based on Miyazaki (1977). The same example is used in Bester
and Strausz (2001), where the analysis is restricted to single–stage face–to–face
communication.
Example: There are two types of agents; each type is equally likely. The prin-
cipal chooses the agent’s speed of work y ∈ I R+ and pays him a wage w. When
the agent’s type is ti, the principal’s and the agent’s payoﬀs are vi(y) − w and
6For an exact demonstration of this approach see Bester and Strausz (2001).
7ui(y) + w, respectively, with
v1(y) = 10y − y
2,v2(y) = 10y − y
2/4, u1(y) = −y
2/5,u2(y) = −y
2/6. (10)
The agent’s utility satisﬁes Assumption 1 for the speciﬁcation ϕ(x,y) = −y2,
ψ(x,y) = 0, z1 = 1/5, and z2 = 1/6. 
3 Communication
To address the problem of asymmetric information, the principal selects a commu-
nication device, which is a convenient, technical description of information trans-
mission in most general form.7 The device allows the agent to send a report upon
which the principal receives a message. More speciﬁcally, a communication device
D = (R,M,B) speciﬁes a set of reports R = {r1,...,rk,...,r|R|} with |R| ≤ ∞,
a set of messages M = {m1,...,mh,...,m|M|} with |M| ≤ ∞, and a mapping
B:R → ∆(M), where ∆(M) denotes the set of probability distributions over M.8
In what follows, we use the notation B(rk) = βk = (βk1,...,βkh,...,βk|M|). The
interpretation of a communication system is that the principal receives message
mh with probability βkh after the agent has chosen the report rk. Note that the
principal cannot directly observe the agent’s report.
A communication device D = (R,M,B) is deterministic if R = M and
βkk = 1. In this case, the principal receives the message mk with probability
one, when the agent sends the report mk. Deterministic communication devices
describe standard face–to–face communication, because the agent’s report is di-
rectly transmitted to the principal without noise. Due to his lack of commitment,
however, the principal may prefer not to receive too much information. By using
a non–deterministic communication device, he is able to ﬁne–tune the amount of
information that is actually transferred to him.
The message received by the principal is publicly veriﬁable. For a given com-
munication system D, a contract speciﬁes a ﬁrst–stage decision x = (x1,...,
xh,...,x|M|) and a monetary transfer w = (w1,...,wh,...,w|M|) contingent upon
7The communication literature (e.g. Barany (1992), Ben-Porath (1998, 2003), Forges (1988,
1990a)) has investigated to what extent the somewhat mechanical concept of a communica-
tion device is equivalent to other, more conventional forms of communication in settings with
complete and incomplete information.
8To simplify the exposition and to avoid measure–theoretic complications, we restrict both
R and M to be countable. Our analysis can be extended to the case where R and M are metric
spaces.
8the message received by the principal. Of course, the principal will also use this
message to update his beliefs about the agent’s type before selecting his second–
stage decision. Let p = (p11,...,pih,...,p|T||M|) denote the principal’s beliefs.
Thus, upon observing message mh, the principal believes that the agent is of
type ti with probability pih ≥ 0, where
P
i pih = 1. For each message mh, the
principal’s strategy y = (y1,...,yh,...,y|M|) speciﬁes a second–stage decision
yh.9
Given a communication system D and a contract (x,w), the principal and the
agent are involved in the following game: First the agent chooses a report, which
results in a message to the principal. After receiving a message the principal
selects a second–stage decision based upon his beliefs over the agent’s type. The
contracting parties are constrained to the outcomes that can be realized as a
Perfect Bayesian equilibrium of this game.
We allow the agent to employ a mixed reporting strategy and denote by
qi = (qi1,...,qik,...,qi|R|) the strategy of type ti. Thus, the ti–agent selects report
rk with probability qik ≥ 0, where
P
k qik = 1. When selecting a report, the agent
anticipates the principal’s decision in the second stage. Therefore, the agent’s






ik βkh [ui(xh,yh) + wh], (11)
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for all mh ∈ M such that qjk βkh > 0 for some (tj,rk) ∈ T × R. In summary,
(q,y,p) constitutes a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium if conditions (11)–(13) are
satisﬁed.
The message mh is not used if
P
k qjk βkh = 0 for all types tj ∈ T. The
solution concept of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium does not put any restrictions
9Note that Y may contain the set of probability distributions over some underlying set of
deterministic decisions. Therefore, we do not rule out random decisions.
9on the principal’s beliefs in (13) for such an out–of–equilibrium message and so
pih ≥ 0 with
P
i pih = 1 is arbitrary. Actually, all messages that are not used in
equilibrium can simply be deleted from the message set M without changing the
equilibrium outcome. We use this insight in Section 5 to derive restrictions on
the cardinality of the message set M.
Part of the principal’s problem is ﬁnding an optimal communication system
D. The following result provides a ﬁrst step in this direction by applying the
Revelation Principle for Bayesian games (see: Myerson (1982), Forges (1986)). It
shows that, without loss of generality, one can assume that the set of the agent’s
reports is a copy of his types and that the agent reveals his type truthfully to the
communication system.
Lemma 1 Consider a given contract (x,w). Suppose (q,y,p) is a Perfect Baye-
sian equilibrium under the communication system D = (R,M,B). Then there
exists a communication system ˆ D = ( ˆ R, ˆ M, ˆ B) with ˆ R = T and ˆ M = M such
that (ˆ q,y,p) with ˆ qii = 1, for all ti ∈ T, is a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium under
ˆ D. Moreover,
P
k ˆ qik ˆ βkh =
P
k qik βkh for all (ti,mh) ∈ T ×M, i.e. ˆ qi and qi induce
the same the probability distribution over M.
By Lemma 1, the principal may restrict himself to an incentive compatible
communication system, under which the agent reports his type honestly and the
communication device garbles this information when sending a message to the
principal.
Lemma 1 leaves open which restrictions can be imposed on the cardinality of
M. The Revelation Principle for Bayesian games actually goes beyond the lemma
by showing that, without loss of generality, the principal may set M = Y so that
he will select y after receiving the message m = y. The ‘canonical’ communication
device (T,Y,B) may therefore be interpreted as a mediator who ﬁrst asks the
agent for his private information and subsequently recommends some action y to
the principal. This insight may be helpful for solving the contracting problem if
the set Y contains only a few elements. In most applications, however, Y will
be large because it includes continuous action choices or the set of continuation
contracts in a multi–stage environment. Therefore, we will establish a more
suitable restriction on M below in Section 5.
Example: In Bester and Strausz (2001) it is shown that in our example the
principal’s maximum payoﬀ is 55/2 when he is restricted to deterministic com-
10munication. The principal attains this payoﬀ with the contract w∗ = (5,20)
and the deterministic communication device D = (T,T,B) with β11 = β22 = 1
and β12 = β21 = 0. The payoﬀ is supported by the Perfect Bayesian Equilib-
rium (q∗,y∗,p∗) with q∗
1 = (1/2,1/2), q∗
2 = (0,1), y∗ = (5,10), p∗
1 = (1,0) and
p∗
2 = (1/3,2/3). Thus, type t1 randomizes between messages and so the principal
remains imperfectly informed after receiving the message t2. In line with Lemma
1, this outcome under the deterministic device D can be replicated by a noisy
communication device ˆ D so that the agent reports his type truthfully. Indeed, it
is easy to see that under ˆ D = ( ˆ R, ˆ M, ˆ B) with ˆ R = ˆ M = T and ˆ β11 = ˆ β12 = 1/2,
ˆ β21 = 0 and ˆ β22 = 1 the outcome (ˆ q,y∗,p∗) with ˆ q1 = (1,0) and ˆ q2 = (0,1)
constitutes a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Yet, we will show below in Section 5
that ˆ D is not optimal within the class of noisy communication devices. Through
a noisy communication channel the principal may be able to achieve a higher
payoﬀ than through deterministic communication. 
4 Optimal Contracts
For a given set of messages M, Lemma 1 allows us to state the principal’s problem
as a programming problem in which the agent’s reporting behavior has to satisfy
standard incentive compatibility restrictions. Let βi = (βi1,...,βih,...,βi|M|)
and β = (β1,...,βi,...,β|T|). Then the principal’s objective is to maximize his
expected payoﬀ
maxx,y,w,β,p V (x,y,w,β,p) ≡
X
i,h γiβih[vi(xh,yh) − wh] (14)
subject to the incentive compatibility constraints
X
hβih[ui(xh,yh) + wh] ≥
X
hβjh[ui(xh,yh) + wh], (15)
for all ti,tj ∈ T × T; the agent’s individual rationality constraints
X
hβih[ui(xh,yh) + wh] ≥ 0, (16)













11for all mh such that βjhγj > 0 for some tj ∈ T. In what follows, we refer to
(14)–(18) as the principal’s contracting problem for a given message set M. Let
V(M) denote the principal’s expected payoﬀ from a solution to this problem.
There remain two diﬃculties to derive a tractable procedure for solving the
principal’s problem. First, problem (14)–(18) is stated for a given message set
M. Therefore, a characterization of the optimal message set is required. Second,
it is unclear which of the incentive compatibility and individual rationality con-
straints are actually binding. The ﬁrst diﬃculty is a fundamental one, while the
latter is more of a computational nature. It turns out that the two problems are
nevertheless related. By ﬁnding an answer to the second problem in this section,
we are able to handle the more fundamental one in the following section.
In order to identify the binding constraints, we proceed by relaxing the prin-
cipal’s contracting problem in two directions. First, we follow the standard ap-
proach and focus on local rather than global constraints. In problems with full
commitment this approach is valid if the agent’s preferences satisfy a natural
single–crossing condition. Eﬀectively, the single–crossing condition reduces the
complexity of the contracting problem because it identiﬁes which of the global
incentive–constraints are binding. It is well–known (e.g. Bester and Strausz
(2001)), however, that this assumption fails to simplify the principal’s problem
under imperfect commitment if he is restricted to a deterministic communication
device. Indeed, with this type of communication and lack of commitment “any
incentive constraint could turn out to be binding at the optimum” (Laﬀont and
Tirole (1993), p. 377). It is an important insight of our analysis below that this
is no longer the case if the principal is able to employ a noisy communication sys-
tem. In this situation, the standard approach can be used to study contracting
problems for which a single–crossing condition such as Assumption 1 holds.
In addition to considering only local incentive constraints, we relax the prob-
lem in a second direction. Rather than considering message–dependent transfers
w, we introduce type–dependent transfers ω = (ω1,...,ωi,...,ω|T|). As long
as |T| < |M|, replacing w ∈ I R
|M| by ω ∈ I R
|T|, reduces the number of vari-
ables in the principal’s problem. Since we can, for a given β, transform any
message–dependent transfer w into a type–dependent transfer ω by specifying
ωi =
P
h βihwh, allowing the principal to use type–dependent transfers relaxes his
contracting problem.
Speciﬁcally, we relax the principal’s contracting problem by replacing the
global constraints (15) and (16) in the principal’s contracting problem by down-
12ward incentive and monotonicity constraints. The downward incentive constraints
require that
X
hβihui(xh,yh) + ωi ≥
X
hβi−1,hui(xh,yh) + ωi−1, (19)
for all ti ∈ T, where ω0 ≡ 0 and β0h ≡ 0 for all mh ∈ M.10 The monotonicity





for all ti ∈ T\{t1}.




i,h γi[βihvi(xh,yh) − ωi] (21)
subject to (17),(18),(19), and (20).
For a given message set M, let W(M) denote the principal’s expected payoﬀ from
a solution of the relaxed contracting problem (21). The following lemma shows
that the constraints of the relaxed problem are implied by the constraints of the
original problem.
Lemma 2 If there exists a (x,y,w,β,p) satisfying the constraints of the prin-
cipal’s contracting problem, then there exists a (x,y,ω,β,p) satisfying the con-
straints of the relaxed contracting problem. Therefore, W(M) ≥ V(M).
Obviously, the downward incentive constraints are binding in the relaxed con-
tracting problem, because otherwise the principal could increase his payoﬀ by
lowering ω. This in combination with the single–crossing condition on prefer-
ences allows us to show that the local constraints (19) and (20) are suﬃcient
to guarantee global incentive compatibility and individual rationality. As a re-
sult, we can show that the solution of the principal’s contracting problem can be
derived from solving the relaxed problem:
Proposition 1 Let (x∗,y∗,ω∗,β∗,p∗) denote a solution to the relaxed contract-






i,i = 1,...,|T|, the tuple (x∗,y∗,w∗,β∗,p∗) is a solution to the principal’s con-
tracting problem and generates the expected payoﬀ V(M) = W(M).
10Thus for type t1 condition (19) is simply the participation constraint.
13The proposition shows that the solution of the principal’s contracting problem
can be obtained by solving the relaxed problem. Indeed, the relaxed problem (21)
is much easier to solve than the original problem (14), because the |T|×|T−1|+|T|
constraints in (15) – (16) are replaced by the 2|T|−1 constraints in (19) – (20).
In fact, the usual approach to screening problems with full commitment is to
ignore the |T|−1 monotonicity constraints in (20) and then to check under what
conditions, e.g. on the distribution of the agent’s types, they are automatically
satisﬁed by the solution. Proposition 1 shows that the same procedure can be
used to solve the principal’s problem in the context of imperfect commitment.
5 Optimal Message Spaces
Although Proposition 1 indicates how to simplify the principal’s contracting prob-
lem for a given message space M, it does not say anything about the optimal
cardinality of the message set itself. To investigate this issue, we say that M∗
is an optimal message set if W(M∗) ≥ W(M0) for any other message set M0.
Note that, by Proposition 1, if (x∗,y∗,ω∗,β∗,p∗) solves the relaxed contracting
problem under the message set M∗, then V (x∗,y∗,w∗,β∗,p∗) = V(M∗) = W(M∗)





i,i = 1,...,|T|. By Lemma 2, therefore, if M∗
is an optimal message set, then V(M∗) = W(M∗) ≥ W(M0) ≥ V(M0) for any
other message set M0. That is, the principal’s expected payoﬀ from solving his
contracting problem with an arbitrary message set M0 cannot be higher than his
expected payoﬀ from (x∗,y∗,w∗,β∗,p∗) under the message set M∗.
To determine the cardinality of an optimal message set, an insight from the
theory of linear optimization turns out to be useful. To describe a linear program,
let A be an n × m–matrix, c ∈ I R
m and b ∈ I R
n. For ﬁnite n and (possibly)
inﬁnite m the following program is a linear semi-inﬁnite program with m decision
variables x ∈ I R
m
+ and n constraints:11
maxx
X
hchxh subject to Ax = b, x ≥ 0. (22)
By a fundamental result in the theory of linear programming, whenever a ﬁnite
linear program has a solution, then one can be found among the extreme points
of the set of feasible solutions in (22). Therefore the program has a basic solution
x∗, i.e. the number of non–zero components of x∗ is no greater than the rank of
11See Anderson and Nash (1987) for the theory linear of linear programming in inﬁnite–
dimensional spaces.
14A. The following lemma extends this result to linear problems with an inﬁnite
number of decision variables.
Lemma 3 If there exists a solution x∗ ∈ I R
m to program (22), then there exists
a solution x0 with at most n non–zero components.
Of course, the relaxed contracting problem (21) is not a linear programming
problem. But, we can apply the above lemma by replacing each vector βh =
(β1h,...,β|T|h) by λh βh, with λh ≥ 0, and adding the constraints
P
h λhβh = 1
for all mh ∈ M. By keeping x,y,β and p ﬁxed, we thus construct a programming
problem that is linear in λ = (λ1,...,λ|M|) and ω. Lemma 3 then allows us to
show that there is an upper bound on the number of messages mh for which a
solution of the relaxed problem requires that λh > 0. Since all other messages
with λh = 0 are redundant, we are able to derive restrictions on the cardinality
of the optimal message set.
In what follows, we say that a subset of constraints in the relaxed contracting
problem is not binding at the solution (x∗,y∗,ω∗,β∗,p∗), if (x∗,y∗,ω∗,β∗,p∗) re-
mains a solution for maximizing W also when this subset of constraints is deleted
from the relaxed problem.
Proposition 2 Let (x∗,y∗,ω∗,β∗,p∗) be a solution of the relaxed contracting
problem for the message set M = T. Suppose that the monotonicity constraints
(20) are not binding. Then M = T is an optimal message set.
Under the conditions of Proposition 2, an optimal communication system has
a rather simple structure: The agent reports his type truthfully and the principal
receives a message that indicates a type of the agent. Yet, in general the principal
remains imperfectly informed because the communication device is noisy; it thus
may suggest a type to the principal that diﬀers from the true type, as reported
by the agent.
Eﬀectively, under an optimal contract with M = T the principal oﬀers a
menu (x,y,w) that speciﬁes his decisions (xi,yi) in combination with a transfer
wi for each type ti ∈ T of the agent. Yet, the agent cannot select directly
from this menu. Instead, the communication device allows him only to select one
out of |T| probability distributions over the |T| elements in (x,y,w). By incentive
15compatibility, the ti–type selects the probability distribution βi so that he receives
(xj,yj,wj) with probability βij.
Proposition 2 reveals how imperfect commitment inﬂuences the communica-
tion between the contracting parties: The Revelation Principle for contracting
games with perfect commitment shows that M = T is an optimal message set.
Further, under perfect commitment it is always optimal to set βii = 1, i.e. the
agent’s honest report about his type is transmitted without distortions to the
principal. Typically, this form of ‘direct’ communication is no longer optimal
when the principal cannot contractually commit himself to all of his actions. In
this situation, he may prefer to become imprecisely informed by setting βii < 1.
There remains the obvious question of what happens when some of the
monotonicity constraints are binding. In this case the procedure outlined be-
low Lemma 3 is still applicable. Yet, binding monotonicity constraints cannot
simply be deleted from the relaxed problem. Because the number of binding
constraints increases, also the cardinality of the optimal message set increases.
Proposition 3 Let (x∗,y∗,ω∗,β∗,p∗) be a solution of the relaxed contracting
problem for the message set M = T ∪ {1,...,K}. If for this solution not more
than K of the monotonicity constraints are binding, then M = T ∪{1,...,K} is
an optimal message set.
Hence, with binding monotonicity we lose the intuitive property that the
cardinality of the optimal message space equals the cardinality of the type space
and can therefore be interpreted as the type space. Yet, since the number of
binding monotonicity constraints is at most |T| − 1 the upper bound on the
cardinality of an optimal message set is 2|T| − 1.
The proposition suggests the following algorithm for solving contracting prob-
lems with imperfect commitment: One starts with the message set M = T and
solves the relaxed problem ignoring the monotonicity constraints. If the solution
automatically satisﬁes these constraints, one has found the optimal message set.
If not, one repeatedly increases the cardinality of the message set until one ﬁnds
a solution for which the number of binding monotonicity constraints matches the
number of additional messages.
It would be helpful to have conditions on the primitives of the model which
guarantee that |M| = |T| suﬃces for an optimal message set. To address this
question, we ﬁrst note that monotonicity conditions are also well–known from
16contracting with full commitment. There incentive compatibility and the single
crossing property require that schedules are monotonic in type. Our monotonic-
ity condition (20) is the counterpart of this condition for the case with imperfect
commitment. In particular, if the variable y is irrelevant and messages are truth-
ful (βii = 1) then the monotonicity condition (20) simpliﬁes to the standard
requirement that the schedule (x1,...,x|T|) is monotonic in type. Hence, it is the
non–contractible decision y and the need for stochastic messages which make the
monotonicity requirement more complicated than under perfect commitment.
Already under perfect commitment the monotonicity condition complicates
the analysis because it leads to the problem of bunching. As is well–known, this
problem can be avoided by assuming that the probability distribution of types
satisﬁes a monotone hazard rate condition. For problems with imperfect commit-
ment, however, we cannot expect that assumptions on the distribution of types
will suﬃce to circumvent problems of monotonicity. With imperfect commitment,
the variable y plays a non–trivial role in the monotonicity condition. Since y is
determined by the no–commitment constraint (17), monotonicity depends also
on the principal’s decision behavior and cannot be guaranteed by conditions on
the agent’s distribution of types.
We can make this more precise in the context of our example. With two types
there is only a single monotonicity condition, which for |M| = |T| = 2 can be
written as
(β21 − β11)|ϕ(x1,y1)| + (β22 − β12)|ϕ(x2,y2)| ≥ 0. (23)
Without loss of generality we may assume that message m1 is more indicative
of type t1 than message m2, because messages can always be labelled such that
β11/β21 ≥ β12/β22. Now using β12 = 1−β11 and β22 = 1−β21, we obtain β11 ≥ β21
so that (23) simpliﬁes to
|ϕ(x2,y2)| ≥ |ϕ(x1,y1)|. (24)
In our example this condition is equivalent to y2 ≥ y1 because ϕ(x,y) = −y2.
Hence, the monotonicity condition will be satisﬁed automatically whenever the
principal chooses a larger y after he receives a message that is less indicative of








As this is satisﬁed in our example, we can ignore the monotonicity condition and
17be conﬁdent that a message space with |M| = 2 is optimal. We close this section
by calculating the optimal contract in our example:
Example: We will show that M = T is an optimal message set. To simplify
notation, let β1 = (a,1−a) and β2 = (1−b,b). Thus if the agent selects the report
t1, the principal receives the message t1 with probability a and the message t2
with probability 1−a. Similarly, if the agent selects t2, the principal receives the
message t2 with probability b and the message t1 with probability 1−b. We ﬁrst
solve the relaxed problem ignoring the monotonicity constraint.
The (binding) downward constraints (19) are equivalent to
− by
2
2/6 − (1 − b)y
2
1/6 + ω2 = −ay
2
1/6 − (1 − a)y
2
2/6 + ω1, (26)
−ay
2
1/5 − (1 − a)y
2
2/5 + ω1 = 0.









1(5 + a − 5b) + y
2
2(1 − a + 5b)]/30. (27)
When the principal receives the message ti, he believes that the agent’s type is
t1 with probability p1i and type t2 with probability p2i = 1−p1i. According to (17)
he selects yi = 20/[1+3p1i]. Since p11 = a/(1−b+a) and p12 = (1−a)/(1−a+b),
we have that
y1 = 20(a − b + 1)/(4a − b + 1), y2 = 20(a − b − 1)/(4a − b − 4). (28)


















Substitution of (27) and (28) into W and maximizing with respect to a and b
yields a∗ = 137/172 and b∗ = 1. Hence, β∗
1 = (137/172,35/172) and β∗
2 = (0,1).




























2 and so the monotonicity constraint (20) is not binding. Thus





i,i = 1,2, yields
w
∗
1 = 97745/16224, w
∗
2 = 506245/16224. (31)
By Proposition 1 (x∗,y∗,w∗,β∗,p∗) is a solution to the principal’s contracting
problem; his expected payoﬀ from this solution is W ∗ = 71645/2496. By Propo-
sition 2 this is the highest possible expected payoﬀ that he could achieve by any
arbitrary communication device. Also, as we have pointed out at the end of Sec-
tion 3, by using a deterministic device the principal could get at most a payoﬀ of
55/2, which is less than W ∗. This shows that in our example face–to–face com-
munication is dominated by noisy communication. 
The example illustrates some important diﬀerences between direct and noisy
communication. With direct communication it is unclear which of the incentive
constraints are binding; in the example this happens to be the incentive constraint
of the ineﬃcient type. With noisy communication, however, the eﬃcient type’s
incentive constraint is binding. As we have shown above, this feature is a general
characteristic of optimal general communication devices.12
Also, in the example the principal obtains a higher payoﬀ through noisy com-
munication than through direct communication. This can be explained by the
importance of stochastic messages in contracting problems with imperfect com-
mitment. With direct communication, such stochastic messages can only be gen-
erated if the agent himself mixes between the available reports. This requires him
to be indiﬀerent between the outcomes of all reports that he sends with positive
probability. In contrast, when the principal uses noisy communication, the agent
only has to prefer the overall mixing probabilities associated with his report to
the probabilities associated with the other reports. That is, the agent’s incentive
constraint is only expressed as a weighted average over the induced outcomes
rather than for each individual outcome. Consequently, a noisy communication
device has more degrees of freedom for generating stochastic messages.
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper presents a framework to study principal–agent problems with adverse
selection and limited commitment. It demonstrates that by allowing for gen-
12Mitusch and Stausz (2005) obtain a similar qualitative diﬀerence in a speciﬁc game of cheap
talk without transfers.
19eral communication devices one can drastically simplify the derivation of optimal
contracts. Instead, the literature on such problems has limited itself to direct,
one–shot communication between the contracting parties. This not only restricts
the parties’ communication capabilities, but also makes it diﬃcult to identify the
binding incentive constraints of the contracting problem. In contrast, we allow
the contracting parties to employ a general communication device. This together
with a standard single–crossing assumption enables us to characterize the struc-
ture of optimal contracts: In the same way as in screening problems with full
commitment, only the local downward incentive constraints turn out to be bind-
ing. Further, we derive an upper bound on the cardinality of message sets under
an optimal communication device. These insights yield a tractable procedure for
solving screening problems with imperfect commitment.
One further advantage of adopting a general communication device is that
none of the arguments in this paper depend on there being only one agent.13
Therefore our methodology is applicable also to the case of multiple agents. This
diﬀers from the extension of the Revelation Principle for direct communication
derived in Bester and Strausz (2001), which does not hold for multiple agents
(see Bester and Strausz (2000)). The reason is that with direct communication
the agent has to be indiﬀerent between all messages that he selects with posi-
tive probability. Therefore, it may be impossible to reduce the cardinality of the
message space for several agents. In contrast, a noisy communication device gen-
erates random messages from a pure reporting strategy and so the agent does not
have to be kept indiﬀerent between diﬀerent reports. This facilitates information
transmission and gives more ﬂexibility to reduce the number of messages under
an optimal contract.
13In particular, our basic Lemma 1, the Revelation Principle for Bayesian games, holds for
an arbitrary number of agents (see: Myerson (1982), Forges (1986)).
207 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: Let (q,y,p) be a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium under the
communication system D = (R,M,B), i.e. (q,y,p) satisﬁes conditions (11)–(13).
Deﬁne the communication system ˆ D = ( ˆ R, ˆ M, ˆ B) by ˆ R = T, ˆ M = M, and
ˆ βih =
P
k qik βkh for all (ti,mh) ∈ T × M. Further let ˆ q satisfy ˆ qii = 1 for all
ti ∈ T, and ˆ qij = 0 whenever ti 6= tj.
Then
P
k ˆ qik ˆ βkh = ˆ βih =
P
k qik βkh, which proves the second part of Lemma
1. This immediately implies that (ˆ q,y,p) satisﬁes conditions (12) and (13) of a
Perfect Bayesian equilibrium under the communication system ˆ D. It thus remains
to show that (ˆ q,y,p) satisﬁes also condition (11). Suppose the contrary, i.e. there
exists a q0 such that
X
k,h ˆ qik ˆ βkh [ui(xh,yh) + wh] =
X
h





ik ˆ βkh [ui(xh,yh) + wh],
for some q0
i and some ti ∈ T. This implies that there is a tj ∈ T such that
X
h
ˆ βih [ui(xh,yh) + wh] <
X
h
ˆ βjh [ui(xh,yh) + wh]. (33)
Therefore, by deﬁnition of ˆ βih and ˆ βjh,
X
k,h qikβkh [ui(xh,yh) + wh] <
X
k,h qjkβkh [ui(xh,yh) + wh]. (34)
By this inequality, qi fails to satisfy (11) and so it is not an optimal reporting
strategy for type ti under the communication system D. Therefore, (q,y,p) is not
a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium under the communication system D, a contradic-
tion. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2: First, we show that the incentive constraints in (15) imply
the monotonicity constraints in (20). By Assumption 1, the incentive constraints
in (15) imply that
X
h[βih − βi−1,h][zi ϕ(xh,yh) + ψ(xh,yh) + wh] ≥ 0, (35)
X
h[βi−1,h − βih][zi−1 ϕ(xh,yh) + ψ(xh,yh) + wh] ≥ 0,
for all ti ∈ T\{t1}. Adding these inequalities yields
X
h[βih − βi−1,h][zi − zi−1]ϕ(xh,yh) ≥ 0. (36)
21Since Assumption 1 implies (zi − zi−1)ϕ(x,y) > 0, this shows that (15) implies
(20). By deﬁning ωi =
P
h βihwh, it immediately follows that (15) implies (19).
This conﬁrms the ﬁrst part of the lemma.
To prove the second statement, let (x∗,y∗,w∗,β∗,p∗) be a solution to the prin-






Since (x∗,y∗,w∗,β∗,p∗) satisﬁes the constraints (15) and (16), it follows by
the argument above that (x∗,y∗,ω∗,β,p∗) satisﬁes (19) and (20). Therefore,
(x∗,y∗,ω∗,β∗,p∗) satisﬁes all the constraints in (21) and W(x∗,y∗,ω∗,β∗,p∗) =
V (x∗,y∗,w∗,β∗,p∗) = V(M). Therefore, the principal’s expected payoﬀ from the
solution of the relaxed problem cannot be less than V(M). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1: Note that for (x∗,y∗,ω∗,β∗,p∗) all the constraints in
(19) are binding. Indeed, if the inequality would hold for the downward constraint
of some type ti, then the principal could increase his expected payoﬀ by lowering


























for all ti ∈ T.
It remains to show that the combination (x∗,y∗,w∗,β∗,p∗) satisﬁes the incen-





















so that we may rewrite (37) as
µi = µi−1 − zi (θi − θi−1), (39)
for all ti ∈ T\{t1}. Applying (39) iteratively yields
µi = µ1 −
Xi
`=2 z` (θ` − θ`−1). (40)
Thus, for all (ti,tj) ∈ T × T,
(ziθi + µi) − (ziθj + µj) = zi(θi − θj) (41)
+
Xj
`=2 z` (θ` − θ`−1) −
Xi
`=2 z` (θ` − θ`−1).
22If i < j then
Xj
`=2 z` (θ` − θ`−1) −
Xi
`=2 z` (θ` − θ`−1) =
Xj
`=i+1 z` (θ` − θ`−1) (42)
=
Xj
`=i+1 (z` − zi)(θ` − θ`−1) + zi(θj − θi) ≥ zi(θj − θi),
where the inequality follows because the monotonicity condition (20) and As-
sumption 1 imply Sign(θ` − θ`−1) = Sign(ϕ) = Sign(zl − zi) for l > i so that
(z` − zi)(θ` − θ`−1) ≥ 0.
If i > j, then
Xj
`=2 z` (θ` − θ`−1) −
Xi
`=2 z` (θ` − θ`−1) = −
Xi
`=j+1 z` (θ` − θ`−1) (43)
=
Xi
`=j+1 (zi − z`)(θ` − θ`−1) + zi(θj − θi) ≥ zi(θj − θi),
because (zi − z`)(θ` − θ`−1) ≥ 0 as i > `.
By (42) and (43), we obtain that (41) is non–negative so that ziθi + µi ≥
ziθj + µj for all (ti,tj) ∈ T × T. This shows that (x∗,y∗,w∗,β∗,p∗) satisﬁes the
incentive compatibility conditions in (15).
To show that (x∗,y∗,w∗,β∗,p∗) also satisﬁes the individual rationality condi-










h] = 0. (44)
As we have shown that (x∗,y∗,w∗,β∗,p∗) satisﬁes the incentive compatibility
































where the second inequality follows from the monotonicity condition (20). Thus
also the individual rationality conditions in (16) are satisﬁed.
We conclude that (x∗,y∗,w∗,β∗,p∗) satisﬁes all constraints (15)-(18) of the
principal’s problem. It yields the principal the payoﬀ V (x∗,y∗,w∗,β∗,p∗) =
W(x∗,y∗,ω∗,β∗,p∗) = W(M). By Lemma 2 the original contracting problem
cannot yield more than W(M) and so we have V(M) = W(M). Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3: If x∗ has ﬁnitely many non-zero entries, then a standard
argument (e.g. Theorem 2.5 of Anderson and Nash (1987, p.23)) shows that there
23exists a basic optimal solution to program (22). Since Rank(A) ≤ n, it follows
that a basic solution to (22) has at most n non-zero entries. Now suppose x∗ has
inﬁnitely many non-zero entries. Following the approach of the proof of Theorem
4.8 of Anderson and Nash (1987, p.76), we show that there exists a solution ¯ x
with at most n + 2 non-zero entries, which then implies that there is a basic
solution that has at most n non-zero entries.
Let V ∗ ≡
P
h chx∗
h be the value of program (22). Extend the matrix A by
adding the row vector c = (c1,c2,...) to ˆ A. That is, ˆ A ∈ I R
(n+1)×m consists of
the column vectors ˆ ai = (a1i,a2i,...,ani,ci). Consequently, any x ≥ 0 which is a
solution to
ˆ Ax = ˆ b ≡ (b,V
∗) (46)
is also a solution to (22), as it satisﬁes Ax = b and has the value c.x = V ∗.
In particular, x∗ is a solution to (46). Deﬁne the cone C = {λˆ ai|λ ≥ 0,i =
1,2,...,} ⊂ I R
n+1 generated by the column vectors (ˆ a1,ˆ a2,...) in ˆ A. Since











ˆ b is an inﬁnite mixture of points in C and, because C lies in the ﬁnite Euclidean
space I R
n+1, it follows that ˆ b lies in the convex hull of C (Rubin and Wesler
(1958)). Hence, Caratheodory’s theorem (Rockafellar (1970), Theorem 17.1, p.
155) implies that ˆ b can be written as a convex combination of k ≤ n+2 elements
(ξ1,...,ξk) in C. That is, there exists (µ1,...,µk) with
P





Since for each ξj ∈ C there exists an i(j) such that ξj can be written as λjˆ ai(j),






Now let J(i) ≡ {j|i(j) = i} and deﬁne ¯ xi ≡
P
J(i)µjλj. It follows that ¯ x has at
most k ≤ n + 2 non-zero entries and satisﬁes (46). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: Let (x∗,y∗,ω∗,β∗,p∗) be a solution of the re-
laxed contracting problem for the message set M = T with value W ∗ =
24W(x∗,y∗,ω∗,β∗,p∗) = W(T). If the monotonicity constraints (20) are not bind-
ing then (x∗,y∗,ω∗,β∗,p∗) solves the following problem
maxx,y,ω,β,p W(x,y,ω,β,p) (50)
subject to (17), (18) and
X
hβihui(xh,yh) + ωi =
X
hβi−1,hui(xh,yh) + ωi−1 (51)
for all ti ∈ T.
Now suppose the message set T is not optimal. Obviously, the principal cannot
get a higher payoﬀ by using a message set ¯ M with | ¯ M| < |T|. Accordingly, there
must exist a message set ¯ M with | ¯ M| > |T| such that W( ¯ M) > W(T) = W ∗.
We will show that this yields the contradiction that (x∗,y∗,ω∗,β∗,p∗) does not
solve program (50) for the message set M = T.
Let the combination (¯ x, ¯ y, ¯ ω, ¯ β, ¯ p) represent a solution of the relaxed contract-
ing problem given the message set ¯ M, i.e. W(¯ x, ¯ y, ¯ ω, ¯ β, ¯ p) = W( ¯ M). Since all
downward incentive constraints (19) are binding, ¯ ω together with λ1 = ... =
λ| ¯ M| = 1 solves the program
maxλ,ω
X
i,hγi[λh¯ βihvi(¯ xh, ¯ yh) − ωi] (52)
subject to
X
hλh¯ βihui(¯ xh, ¯ yh) + ωi =
X
hλh¯ βi−1,hui(¯ xh, ¯ yh) + ωi−1, (53)
X
hλh¯ βih = 1, (54)





hλh(¯ βjh − ¯ βj−1,h)uj(¯ xh, ¯ yh) (55)
for all ti ∈ T. By substitution we may therefore rewrite problem (52)–(54) as











hλh¯ βih = 1 for all ti ∈ T; (57)
and λh ≥ 0 for all mh ∈ ¯ M.
25The objective function and constraints of problem (56)–(57) are linear in
λ. According to Lemma 3 it has therefore a solution λ∗ with k ≤ |T| strictly
positive entries λ∗
h > 0. Since λ1 = ... = λ| ¯ M| = 1 is also a solution, ¯ W(λ∗) =
¯ W(1,...,1) = W( ¯ M).
Now consider the combination (¯ x, ¯ y,ω(λ∗),β(λ∗), ¯ p) with βih(λ∗) ≡ λ∗
h¯ βih. By
taking from (¯ x, ¯ y,ω(λ∗),β(λ∗), ¯ p) those k entries for which λ∗
h > 0 and |T|−k en-
tries for which λ∗
h = 0, we obtain a combination (x0,y0,ω0,β0,p0) for a message set
M0 with |M0| = |T|. It follows that W(x0,y0,ω0,β0,p0) = W(¯ x, ¯ y,ω(λ∗),β(λ∗), ¯ p)
= ¯ W(λ∗) = W( ¯ M).
By construction, (x0,y0,ω0,β0,p0) satisﬁes (51) and therefore also (19). It also



















= ¯ pih, (58)
for all mh such that β0
jhγj > 0 for some tj ∈ T. From this property of the beliefs p0
it follows immediately that also (17) holds. In summary, (x0,y0,ω0,β0,p0) satisﬁes
all constraints of program (50). But, as W(x0,y0,ω0,β0,p0) > W(x∗,y∗,ω∗,β∗,p∗),
we obtain the contradiction that (x∗,y∗,ω∗,β∗,p∗) cannot solve program (50).
Hence, there cannot exist a message set ¯ M such that W( ¯ M) > W(T). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3: Analogous to the proof of Proposition 2 with the
exception that program (52) now has in addition the K monotonicity constraints.
Hence, program (56) has |T| + K constraints so that according to Lemma 3, it
has a solution λ∗ with at most |T| + K strictly positive entries. Q.E.D.
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